Mistreating Triton

Some experiments to mistreat the Triton concolic execution framework through simple forged C programs.

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Flash Dumping - Part I

First part of a blog post series about our approach to dump a flash chip. In this article we describe how to desolder the flash, design and build the corresponding breakout board.

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Vulnerabilities in High Assurance Boot of NXP i.MX microprocessors

This blog post provides details about two vulnerabilities found by Quarkslab's researchers Guillaume Delugré and Kévin Szkudłapski in the secure boot feature of the i.MX family of application processors built by NXP Semiconductors.

The bugs allow an attacker to subvert the secure boot process to bypass code signature verification and load and execute arbitrary code on i.MX application processors that have the High Assurance Boot feature enabled. These bugs affect 12 i.MX processor families.

The vulnerabilities were discovered and reported to the vendor in September 2016 and the technical details included in this blogpost were disclosed in a joint Quarkslab-NXP presentation at the Qualcomm Mobile Security Summit 2017 in May 19th, 2017. National computer emergency response teams (CERTs) from 4 countries were informed about the issues in March, 2017.

NXP has issued an Engineering Bulletin and two Errata documents (EB00854, ERR010872 and ERR0108873 respectively) providing a brief description of both vulnerabilities, the list of affected processor models along with resolution plans and possible mitigations.

In the rest of the blogpost we describe the relevant features in i.MX processors and the vulnerabilities affecting them.

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Reverse Engineering Samsung S6 SBOOT - Part II

In my previous article , I explained how to load Samsung's proprietary bootloader SBOOT into IDA Pro. The journey to the TEE OS continues in this second article which describes two techniques to locate Trustonic's TEE <t-base in the binary blob.

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PhD defense of Ninon Eyrolles: Obfuscation with Mixed Boolean-Arithmetic Expressions: Reconstruction, Analysis and Simplification Tools


Frozen - An header-only, constexpr alternative to gperf for C++14 users

An open source, header-only library that provides fast, immutable, constexpr-compatible implementation of std::set, std::map, std::unordered_map and std::unordered_set to C++14 users. It can be used as an alternative to gperf.

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Security Assessment of OpenVPN

Quarkslab was hired by OSTIF to perform a security assessment of OpenVPN 2.4.0. We focused on code and cryptography assessment. Results are briefly described in this blog post, and full report is available at its end.

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Exploiting MS16-145: MS Edge TypedArray.sort Use-After-Free (CVE-2016-7288)

On February 9, 2017, Natalie Silvanovich from Google Project Zero unrestricted access to P0's issue #983 , titled "Microsoft Edge: Use-after-free in TypedArray.sort", which got assigned CVE-2016-7288 and was patched as part of Microsoft security bulletin MS16-145 during December 2016. In this blog post we discuss how I managed to exploit this UAF issue to obtain remote code execution on MS Edge.

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LIEF - Library to Instrument Executable Formats

QuarksLab is open-sourcing LIEF, a library to parse and manipulate ELF, PE and Mach-O binary formats. This blog post explains the purpose of this project and some parts of its architecture.

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Make Confide great again? No, we cannot

In recent weeks, Confide, a secure instant messaging application, has gained popularity in some circles. This article presents a quick assessment of the security of this application. The official website boasts the confidentiality provided by the product through three qualifiers: encrypted, ephemeral and screenshot protected. Each of these aspects will be studied.

The encryption protocol will be particularly detailed because it is tagged as battle tested, military grade cryptography. We already knew about military grade cryptography, which seems to be a synonym of put AES-256 somewhere, no matter how you use it in many applications, but we had never heard of battle tested cryptography. This article is an opportunity to present this technology.

Developing properly end-to-end communication systems is complex. As we have seen in the past with iMessage, even if cryptographic primitives are correctly implemented and encryption keys are correctly generated and protected, the design is critical to forbid the service operator from being able to eavesdrop messages.

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