Category: Reverse-Engineering

In this blog, we present how QBDI and TritonDSE can be used to attack a complex C++ binary implementing a VM.

In a blog post published last December, we demonstrated how we managed to extract the firmware from a smartwatch by exploiting an out-of-bounds read vulnerability and spying on its screen interface. Follow us on our long and unexpected journey to figure out how this smartwatch can measure heart rate or blood pressure with no visible sensor, the problems we encountered while analyzing its firmware, and how we solved them to uncover The Truth about this device.

This blog post demonstrates how a modern variant of an hardware attack found in the 2000's allowed the extraction of a €12 smartwatch's firmware using only cheap and robust hardware. Damien and Thomas (introduced later in this post) gave a talk on this subject at this year's leHACK edition in Paris.

Ever wanted to find a nice tool to easily represent cartography results and other graphs? The Sourcetrail tool could be a nice solution! In this blog post, we will introduce two of our tools: Numbat, a new Python API for Sourcetrail, and Pyrrha, a mapper collection for firmware cartography.

In this blog post we discuss how to debug Windows' Isolated User Mode (IUM) processes, also known as Trustlets, using the virtual TPM of Microsoft Hyper-V as our target.

This blog post presents an overview of Starlink's User Terminal runtime internals, focusing on the communications that happen within the device and with user applications and some tools that can help further research on the same topic.

In this blogpost we present our brand new version of binbloom, a tool to find the base address of any 32 and 64-bit architecture firmware, and dig into the new method we designed to recover this grail on both of these architectures.

A step by step approach to reverse engineer Hyper-V and have a low level insight into Virtual Trust Levels.

This article describes how Windows Defender implements its network inspection feature inside the kernel through the use of WFP (Windows Filtering Platform), how the device object’s security descriptor protects it from being exposed to potential vulnerabilities and details some bugs I found. As a complement to this post, a small utility is released to test the different bugs.

Microsoft is currently working on Xtended Flow Guard (XFG), an evolved version of Control Flow Guard (CFG), their own control flow integrity implementation. XFG works by restricting indirect control flow transfers based on type-based hashes of function prototypes. This blog post is a deep dive into how the MSVC compiler generates those XFG function prototype hashes.