Tag: 2020

The Ethereum Foundation mandated Quarkslab to perform an audit of the herumi libraries. They provide an API to perform BLS signatures, one of the core components of the new iteration of the Ethereum blockchain, named Ethereum 2.0. While reviewing the architecture of these libraries, their back ends and the adherence with the ongoing RFCs to standardize BLS signature usage, we found some issues primarily regarding their design. Although these are not considered critical, they impact the overall reliability of the libraries. We provide recommendations to improve the design of the libraries, the readability of the code and the usability of both projects.

Latest news from the Proxmark3 world, crunchy bits included...

Microsoft is currently working on Xtended Flow Guard (XFG), an evolved version of Control Flow Guard (CFG), their own control flow integrity implementation. XFG works by restricting indirect control flow transfers based on type-based hashes of function prototypes. This blog post is a deep dive into how the MSVC compiler generates those XFG function prototype hashes.

This blog post analyzes the vulnerability known as "Bad Neighbor" or CVE-2020-16898, a stack-based buffer overflow in the IPv6 stack of Windows, which can be remotely triggered by means of a malformed Router Advertisement packet.

We LOVE interns! Really. We love them because they bring fresh air to the company and because we see them grow, not only during the internship but also after, when they are hired and can get to work on so many other topics. There are 2 goals for us in every internship we offer:

• Explore a topic we don't necessarily know very well, hence train the new expert on the topic,

• Hire you after the internship to keep and share your new expertise with colleagues.

A blog post about the security implemented in the August Smart Lock, with special focus on the Bluetooth Low Energy capabilities.

This post is a noob-friendly introduction to whiteboxes along with the presentation and explanation of a (not-new) collision-based attack. The attack is demonstrated against a public whitebox, using QBDI to instrument and analyze the target in order to produce traces of execution.

This blog post dives into how to get a better understanding of an Android native function by taking full advantage of both Frida and QBDI.

This third article from the Samsung's TrustZone series details some vulnerabilities that were found and how they were exploited to obtain code execution in EL3.

This blog post is a follow-up on the announcement of Triton v0.8, where we explain how we added support for ARMv7 and provide a guideline for adding new architectures.