This blog post presents a vulnerability which affects the widely installed Android web browser.

This blog post deals with QBDI and how it can be used to reverse an Android JNI library

This blog post is about detecting modifications between genuine and repackaged applications.

This blog post is about examining an Android security patch and understanding how it mitigates the vulnerability.

This blog post is about how to efficiently spot code mutations between distinct versions of an Android application.

This blog post is about techniques to disable Android runtime restrictions

Earlier this year, on March 2018, we published a blog post detailing 2 vulnerabilities in the Android Bluetooth stack, which were independently discovered by Quarkslab, but were fixed in the March 2018 Android Security Bulletin while we were in the process of reporting them to Google.

The March 2018 Android Security Bulletin includes fixes for 10 vulnerabilities in its Bluetooth stack, some of which were also independently discovered by Quarkslab, but were fixed while we were in the process of reporting them to Google (spoiler alert: we have reported a few more new Bluetooth vulnerabilities to the Android team — we'll disclose the details after they get fixed). This blogpost shows technical details for a couple of these fixed bugs, which can be triggered remotely and without any user interaction, as well as proof-of-concept code for them.

This article explains a recently disclosed vulnerability, independently discovered by the Google's Project Zero team and by Quarkslab some months ago. To our knowledge, this vulnerability was present, on all Samsung devices using Android 5, and allowed remote code execution as system user simply by browsing a website, by downloading an email attachment or via a malicious third party application with no permission.

Multiple kernel vulnerabilities in the Samsung S4 (GT-I9500)