This blog post deals with QBDI and how it can be used to reverse an Android JNI library

This blog post is about detecting modifications between genuine and repackaged applications.

This blog post is about examining an Android security patch and understanding how it mitigates the vulnerability.

This blog post is about how to efficiently spot code mutations between distinct versions of an Android application.

This blog post is about techniques to disable Android runtime restrictions

Earlier this year, on March 2018, we published a blog post detailing 2 vulnerabilities in the Android Bluetooth stack, which were independently discovered by Quarkslab, but were fixed in the March 2018 Android Security Bulletin while we were in the process of reporting them to Google.

The March 2018 Android Security Bulletin includes fixes for 10 vulnerabilities in its Bluetooth stack, some of which were also independently discovered by Quarkslab, but were fixed while we were in the process of reporting them to Google (spoiler alert: we have reported a few more new Bluetooth vulnerabilities to the Android team — we'll disclose the details after they get fixed). This blogpost shows technical details for a couple of these fixed bugs, which can be triggered remotely and without any user interaction, as well as proof-of-concept code for them.

This article explains a recently disclosed vulnerability, independently discovered by the Google's Project Zero team and by Quarkslab some months ago. To our knowledge, this vulnerability was present, on all Samsung devices using Android 5, and allowed remote code execution as system user simply by browsing a website, by downloading an email attachment or via a malicious third party application with no permission.

Multiple kernel vulnerabilities in the Samsung S4 (GT-I9500)

UPDATE: A way to patch the vulnerability is provided at the end of the article. We explain a vulnerability found when the Samsung Galaxy S5 was released and patched recently by Samsung. It allows a remote attacker to install an arbitrary application by using an unsecure update mechanism implemented in the UniversalMDMClient application related to the Samsung KNOX security solution. The vulnerability has been patched on the Samsung Galaxy S5 but also Note 4 and Alpha. Yet the Samsung Galaxy S4, S4 mini, Note3 and Ace 4 (and possibly others) are still vulnerable.